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TINA LOO
En nous concentrant sur la période qui a suivi immédiatement l’étude de l’urbaniste 
Gordon Stephenson sur le réaménagement d’Halifax en 1957 et précédé le début de 
la relocalisation d’Africville en 1964, nous acquérons une compréhension différente de 
l’ampleur du transfert de population, de la façon dont l’effet combiné de la race et de 
la classe sociale a rendu des gens vulnérables au réaménagement urbain, et du pouvoir 
de l’administration municipale. La compréhension de ces premières initiatives de 
réaménagement nous amène également à porter un regard différent sur Africville. Les 
mesures prises par la Ville à cet endroit ont été façonnées par un changement d’attitudes 
envers le racisme et une tentative, certes inadéquate, de remédier à celui-ci en mettant 
l’accent sur l’une de ses manifestations les plus visibles : la ségrégation.
By focusing on the period immediately following planner Gordon Stephenson’s 
redevelopment study of Halifax in 1957 and before the start of the Africville relocation 
in 1964, we gain a different appreciation of the scale of displacement, the interplay of 
race and class in shaping people’s vulnerability to urban renewal, and the power of the 
municipal state. Understanding these early redevelopment efforts also provides us with 
a different perspective on Africville. The city’s actions there were shaped by shifting 
attitudes towards racism and an attempt, albeit inadequate, to rectify it by focusing on 
one of its most visible manifestations – segregation.
MENTION URBAN RENEWAL IN CANADA and the case of Africville is sure 
to come up. Between 1964 and 1967, the City of Halifax relocated the residents of 
this Black neighbourhood on the Bedford Basin and razed it to the ground.1 It is 
a local story that has travelled beyond the region. Africville circulates – literally 
– on postage stamps, in textbooks, and in young adult fiction in libraries and 
1 The last resident did not leave until 1970; see Donald H. Clairmont and Dennis W. Magill, 
Africville Relocation Report (Halifax: Dalhousie University, Institute of Public Affairs, 1971), 294-
302, http://dalspace.library.dal.ca/handle/10222/55960?show=full. This article has benefitted 
from feedback from the participants at the 2018 Atlantic Canada Studies Conference, the 
Indigenous and Canadian History Group in the Department of History at the University of 
British Columbia, and the Lower Seminar in the Department of History at Queen’s University. 
I would also like to thank the anonymous reviewers for Acadiensis. In addition, I am grateful 
for the research assistance provided by Brennan Dempsey and Susan McClure, Sharon Murray, 
and the staff at the Halifax Municipal Archives.
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through digital media on platforms like iTunes. The federal government has 
designated it a national historic site, and it is featured in the Canadian Museum 
of History’s refurbished Canadian History Hall in the section on “Diversity 
and Human Rights.” What happened to the neighbourhood has come to be a 
powerful signifier of racism in Canada and of Black struggle and resilience.
Gordon Stephenson, whose 1957 redevelopment plan was fundamental 
to transforming the city, supported the neighbourhood’s destruction and 
the relocation of its residents. But he did not consider it a priority. In fact, 
Africville was not part of his study area and he devoted just a few paragraphs 
to it. Moreover, the approximately 400 people who called Africville home 
represented only a small proportion of the estimated 6,000 people displaced 
by urban renewal; indeed, municipal authorities appear to have uprooted more 
Black Haligonians from other parts of the city.2
This is not to deny Africville’s importance or the trauma its residents 
experienced: as scholars working from a variety of disciplines have shown, 
what happened to the neighbourhood reveals the shortcomings of planned 
social change, the spatial dynamics of racism, the workings of state power, 
the politicization of the African Nova Scotian community, the face of 
environmental racism, and the “anti-blackness” of urban planning.3 Nor is it 
to deny Africville’s ongoing significance for Black identity and the politics of 
race in Halifax.
But if we want to understand the postwar reshaping of Halifax more 
generally and the social costs of urban renewal, we need to take a broader 
and a deeper view – one that examines the city as a whole and how municipal 
authorities acquired properties and dealt with their owners and occupants. 
Focusing largely on the period immediately after the Stephenson report and 
before the Africville relocation started, I begin with a brief overview of housing 
in the postwar period and the debates over the proposed slum clearance of part 
2 R.B. Grant, Director of Development, to Kell Antoft, Assistant Director, Administration, Institute 
of Public Affairs, Dalhousie University, re: Africville Relocation Report, 26 November 1971, p. 2, 
City Manager’s Correspondence, 102-4A-129, Halifax Municipal Archives (HMA).
3 See Clairmont and Magill, Africville Relocation Report; Jennifer J. Nelson, Razing Africville: A 
Geography of Racism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008); Tina Loo, “Africville and the 
Dynamics of State Power in Postwar Canada,” Acadiensis 39, no. 2 (Summer/Autumn 2010): 23-
47; James W. St. G. Walker, “Black Confrontation in Sixties Halifax,” in Debating Dissent: Canada 
and the Sixties, ed. Lara Campbell, Dominique Clément, and Gregory S. Kealey (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2011), 173-91; Howard McCurdy, “Africville: Environmental Racism,” 
in Faces of Environmental Racism: Confronting Issues of Global Justice, 2nd ed., ed. Laura Westra 
and Bill E. Lawson (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001), 95-112; and Ted Rutland, Displacing 
Blackness: Planning, Power, and Race in Twentieth-Century Halifax (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2018).
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of Halifax’s North End, an area that was home to a diverse, poor, and working 
class population that included the majority of the city’s Black population. I then 
look at how federal redevelopment dollars allowed Halifax to begin to renew 
itself, starting with its inner core – an area near City Hall and the City Market 
around Jacob Street.
Important as Ottawa was to funding urban renewal, the “federal bulldozer” 
was not the only force reshaping the city. Its effects were reinforced and 
extended by Halifax authorities through their enforcement of Ordinance 
No. 50, a bylaw pertaining to minimum standards for occupancy as well as 
sections of the city charter relating to safety. The North End was again the 
target, this time of the city’s building inspectors. As was the case with so many 
urban renewal schemes, the operation of the federal bulldozer and municipal 
wrecking ball increased housing insecurity. They had the effect of shovelling 
out the poor – both Black and White – to equally bad and often more expensive 
accommodations or pushing them out of the city entirely.
Looking at urban renewal in the immediate aftermath of the Stephenson 
report gives us a different appreciation of the scale of displacement and its 
victims, people who were among Halifax’s poorest citizens. There, as in 
other cities in Atlantic Canada, the areas targetted for redevelopment in the 
postwar period were home to largely White communities of working poor 
and unemployed.4 Halifax’s demography, and specifically the presence of a 
small African Nova Scotian population concentrated in the areas targetted 
for renewal, reveals how both race and class shaped residents’ vulnerability to 
displacement. While exact numbers are lacking, Black Haligonians appear to 
have been disproportionately affected by redevelopment although, in terms of 
numbers, more White Haligonians were uprooted.
The latter aspect of urban renewal is not surprising given that the Black 
population represented less than 2 per cent of the city’s residents in the late 1950s.5 
Yet it raises questions about recent characterizations of planning that underscore 
the primacy of race in city-making. Geographer Ted Rutland makes a compelling 
case for how “anti-blackness” animated urban planning during the 20th century, 
4 Greg Marquis, “Uneven Renaissance: Urban Development in Saint John, 1955-1976,” Journal of 
New Brunswick Studies 1 (2010): 94-97 and John Phyne, “On the Hillside North of the Harbour: 
Changes to the Centre of St. John’s, 1942-1987,” Newfoundland and Labrador Studies 29, no. 1 
(Spring 2014): 8-9.
5 The population figure is based on the 1956 census and reported in Institute of Public Affairs, 
Dalhousie University, The Condition of Negroes of Halifax City, Nova Scotia: A Study Conducted 
by Institute of Public Affairs, Dalhousie University, 1962 (Halifax: Institute of Public Affairs, 
Dalhousie University, 1962), 4-5.
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with consequences for Black and non-Black residents – in Halifax, the focal 
point of his study, and more generally. While there is no doubt “planning is 
an instrument of power and race,” his argument about the fundamental anti-
Blackness of planning does not entirely explain what happened to the thousands 
of poor White residents of Jacob Street and the North End who were displaced. 
As he acknowledges, they constituted the numerical majority of those who 
were uprooted. But his assertion that “a deep-rooted structure of anti-blackness 
has shaped planning’s dealings with all city residents, Black and non-Black” 
is not supported in this instance: as far as I can see, poor White Haligonians 
were neither racialized by the planners who argued for the redevelopment of 
their neighbourhoods nor was the idealized life imagined for them – tenancy 
in public housing – at odds with their status before displacement as it was for 
the uprooted residents of Africville. Tenancy was not imposed on them as it was 
Black Haligonians: they were renters and would continue to be.6
That said, Rutland is certainly right that the displacement and housing 
insecurity that resulted from urban renewal had different consequences for 
Black and White Haligonians. But there was also a diversity of experiences 
with redevelopment among Black residents, between those who lived in the 
North End and those who lived in Africville. Rather than explore it, though, 
his book takes what happened to Africville as normative. It was not. As we will 
see, its residents were treated differently than those who lived in the North 
End – something that points to the many manifestations of anti-Black racism.
As well as exposing the scale of displacement and its victims, an 
examination of urban redevelopment in the aftermath of the Stephenson 
report reveals the crucial role the municipal state played in city making. While 
most studies of urban renewal in Canada focus on the federal government, 
city officials were also instrumental in building a better Halifax. Yet the 
literature on Atlantic Canada emphasizes the weakness of the municipal 
state: a fear of taxation meant there were fewer incorporated municipalities 
in the region than elsewhere, and those that did exist were poorer than their 
counterparts elsewhere in Canada. As E.R. Forbes points out in his analysis 
of the 1930s, not only did they have a smaller tax base but their revenues were 
also often insufficient to allow them to participate in a meaningful way in the 
matching grant programs offered by the federal government.7 In Nova Scotia, 
6 Rutland, Displacing Blackness, 2, 4, and, more generally, chap. 4.
7 E.R. Forbes, “Cutting the Pie into Smaller Pieces: Matching Grants and Relief in the Maritime 
Provinces in the 1930s,” Acadiensis 17, no. 1 (Autumn 1987): 34-55.
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the existence of the poor law – which burdened towns and cities with the cost 
of social services until the 1950s – was a further disincentive to elaborating 
a state apparatus at the municipal level. Instead, churches and charitable 
organizations remained important providers of welfare into the 1960s.8 But, 
as the redevelopment efforts undertaken by the City of Halifax suggest, that 
did not mean municipalities were without power. Nor were they incapable 
of exercising that which they did have in the name of improving people’s 
lives, particularly when it also meant increasing the tax revenues f lowing to 
municipal coffers.
Finally, understanding the redevelopment efforts undertaken by Halifax in 
the late 1950s and early 1960s provides another measure with which to gauge 
what happened in Africville. We see how racism inf luenced the actions of 
municipal authorities – but not just in the way that has been highlighted in 
the literature. The view from Jacob Street and the North End emphasizes, as 
Jennifer J. Nelson does, that Africville “is a story of white domination, a story 
of the making of a slum, and of the operation of technologies of oppression 
and regulation over time.”9 But Africville is also a story about shifting attitudes 
towards racism. The city’s deviations from the practices it followed in the 
rest of Halifax when it came to redeveloping Africville were motivated by an 
awareness of the neighbourhood’s history and its own role in shaping it. In 
that sense those deviations were an attempt to rectify a kind of racism that was 
increasingly unacceptable, namely segregation. As a result its residents were 
treated more liberally by municipal authorities – but still inadequately – than 
were those displaced from other parts of the city, both Black and White.
Like many older cities in Canada and in the Atlantic region, Halifax 
struggled with housing quality and availability in the first decades of the 20th 
century – in no small part because of the devastation that resulted when a 
munitions ship collided with another vessel in the city’s harbour in December 
1917.10 The explosion killed and injured thousands and left thousands more 
without adequate shelter – if any at all. To help these people, the Halifax Relief 
8 In general, see Judith Fingard and Janet Guildford, eds., Mothers of the Municipality: Women, 
Work, and Social Policy in Post-1945 Halifax (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005) and 
especially Janet Guildford, “The End of the Poor Law: Public Welfare Reform in Nova Scotia 
before the Canada Assistance Plan,” in Fingard and Guildford, Mothers of the Municipality, 49-75.
9 Nelson, Razing Africville, 5.
10 Kevin Brushett, “Blots on the Face of the City: the Politics of Slum Housing and Urban 
Renewal in Toronto, 1940-1970” (chap. 1) (PhD diss., Queen’s University, 2001); Marquis, “Uneven 
Renaissance”; Phyne, “On a Hillside North of the Harbour,” 5-46; John Bacher, “From Study to 
Reality: The Establishment of Public Housing in Halifax,” Acadiensis 38, no. 1 (Autumn 1988): 
120-35.
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Commission embarked on what was Canada’s first public housing project – the 
“Hydrostone district” – a 325-unit, English-style garden suburb built amidst 
what used to be the community of Richmond Heights in the North End.11
The Second World War brought Halifax’s housing problems to the forefront 
again. This time the cause was not a catastrophic explosion: it was a flood of 
people. In addition to military personnel, men and women seeking work in 
wartime industries moved to Halifax in great numbers and this put much 
pressure on its limited and aging housing stock. With the influx of just over 
19,000 people between 1939 and 1945, the city of about 65,000 saw its population 
increase by nearly 30 per cent. People crowded into whatever space was 
available: a family of 8 lived in one room, 25 people made do in a 4-room house, 
and 36 in a 12-room building. Those spaces were often in poor condition: a 
1944 housing survey revealed that 43 per cent of the city’s 12,000 dwelling units 
were “not structurally good,” and many lacked basic amenities like sanitary 
facilities.12
The housing shortage was so severe that some considered it detrimental 
to Canada’s war effort. In response, the federal government engaged in a 
publicity campaign to dissuade people from moving to the port city. There 
were also discussions about establishing a 50-mile cordon around Halifax and 
relocating 4,000 people who were not employed in wartime industries out of 
the city to alleviate the problem. The one thing the federal government did not 
do was deepen its involvement in the home construction business. Even after 
the veterans returned and it was clear that those who had moved to the city 
for work were there to stay, Ottawa took a cautious approach. As John Bacher 
points out, the success of the public housing it helped build in Halifax simply 
highlighted the scale of the problem: when it was completed in 1953, the Bayers 
Road project received 1,000 applications for just 161 units.13
Municipal authorities were well aware of the city’s housing problems, and at 
war’s end they converted Department of National Defence barracks and staff 
housing as well as some city-owned properties into emergency shelters. “By no 
means first class,” the 419 units were “immediately occupied and a long waiting 
11 Gordon Fulton, The Hydrostone District, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Historic Sites and Monuments 
Board of Canada Agenda Paper 1993-8 (Ottawa: Historic Sites and Monuments Board of 
Canada, 1993), 223-4. On domestic life there, see Suzanne Morton, Ideal Surroundings: 
Domestic Life in a Working Class Suburb (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995).
12 Bacher, “From Study to Reality,” 130.
13 Bacher, “From Study to Reality,” 129-33.
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list soon formed.”14 Although the federal assistance to these shelters ended in 
1949, the city continued to operate them. When the last was closed in 1961, its 
tenants had to be evicted; this suggests that the housing problem continued.15
Beyond reacting to the housing shortage, the city also recognized the need 
for “a program of reconstruction and rehabilitation” to “effect . . . an orderly 
transition from wartime to peacetime conditions.” To that end, and among 
other things, the terms of reference for its 1945 Master Plan directed officials 
to study Halifax’s housing problem and recommend specific areas for slum 
clearance and the construction of low cost housing.16
Locating the slums of Halifax proved to be relatively straightforward. The 
Master Plan targetted 200 acres in the south end and 160 acres north and east 
of the Citadel as candidates for redevelopment (Figure 1).17 The latter area, 
which comprised the historic North End (an area from, roughly, Cogswell 
Street to North Street, and between Robie and Gottingen Streets) and a number 
of blocks downtown, around city hall and the city market (what would become 
the Jacob Street and, later, the Central Redevelopment Area), were deemed 
in particular need of attention: the buildings were overcrowded, and many 
lacked basic sanitary facilities, were structurally unsound, or both. Worse 
still from the city’s perspective, it spent more on providing the area with fire, 
police, medical, and other social services than it did elsewhere, but the taxes it 
collected were between half and two-thirds what it garnered from an average 
residential neighbourhood. As the Civic Planning Commission put it, “The 
entire community thus subsidizes the maintenance of slums.” Clearance and 
redevelopment would increase property values and hence municipal revenues. 
Perhaps surprisingly, there was little discussion of Africville in the Master 
Plan: all the Civic Planning Commission had to say was that “the residents 
of this district must, as soon as reasonably possible, be provided with decent 
minimum standard housing elsewhere.”18
14 Copy given to Alderman O’Brien, 16 October 1956 (additional information given to Alderman 
O’Brien on minimum standards and housing in Halifax), p. 1, City Manager’s Office Subject Files, 
“Slum Clearance,” 102-4A-57, file 2, HMA.
15 Bacher, “From Study to Reality,” 134.
16 Civic Planning Commission, The Master Plan for the City of Halifax as Prepared by the Civic 
Planning Commission, November 16, 1945 (Halifax: Civic Planning Commission, 1945), 1.
17 The area in the South End was bounded by South Park Street, Spring Garden Road, Inglis 
Street, and the waterfront. The area in the North End was bounded by Cogswell, North Park, 
Cunard, Robie, and North Streets and the waterfront; see Civic Planning Commission, Master 
Plan for the City of Halifax, 46. 
18 Civic Planning Commission, Master Plan for the City of Halifax, 46-55 (quotations on 53 and 55).
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Figure 1 – The 1945 Master Plan for Halifax and the 10 Year Development Plan (1950) 
identified the South End and areas north and east of the Citadel for redevelopment.
Source: Map by Eric Leinberger.
Although the area north and east of the Citadel was a mix of residential 
and commercial properties, the Civic Planning Commission argued it “cannot 
reasonably be considered suitable for individual home ownership.” Instead, 
it imagined the area being redeveloped to provide “thousands of low rental 
apartments” – an idea that was subsequently taken up in Halifax’s 10 Year 
Urban Renewal in Halifax 13
Development Plan, or “Official Town Plan” (1950). In setting out the projects the 
city would embark upon in the immediate future, planning engineer J. Philip 
Dumaresq saw the area as rehousing those displaced in the process of clearing 
the North End as well as those who lost their homes in the blocks east of the 
Citadel around Market Street and City Hall – an area which he considered 
“one of the worst slum districts in the City of Halifax” and a priority for 
redevelopment (Figure 1).19
If identifying the slums of Halifax was easy, the city’s Slum Clearance 
and Public Housing Committee soon learned that doing something about 
them was not. Created in 1951, it held public hearings on the Town Planning 
Board’s proposals to clear parts of the North End in 1951, 1954, and 1956. While 
the exact boundaries of the clearance area changed, it centred on Maynard 
Street and Creighton Street. This neighbourhood – and not Africville – was 
where the majority of Black Haligonians lived, some 1,200 people, or nearly 
three-quarters of the city’s African Nova Scotian population. There may have 
been more African Nova Scotians in this part of Halifax than elsewhere, but 
Whites still made up the majority of the population of the North End. Indeed, 
in contrast to Africville, the Black residents on Maynard and Creighton had 
White neighbours.20 They were spatially integrated into the city, whereas the 
residents of Africville were not.
Most of those appearing before the committee were in favour of slum 
clearance for the same reasons that were put forward in other cities embarking 
on the same program: it would improve the physical and moral health and 
welfare of residents. The Halifax Trades and Labour Council considered “the 
stinking, desolated, over-crowded, expensive slum sections” to be “the biggest 
blight in cities of the world today.” In its view, “to consent to the exploitation of 
oneself is immoral; to consent to the exploitation of others is just as immoral.” 
Supporting slum clearance helped fulfill its aim to “secure a decent, separate 
home for every worker.” On behalf of the Welfare Council of Halifax, social 
worker Gwendolyn Shand argued “decent housing is essential for wholesome 
family life. Poor housing has always been one of the causes of disease, 
19 J. Philip Dumaresq, 10 Year Development Plan, or “Official Town Plan” (Halifax: City of Halifax, 
1950), 1. 
20 The total population of Black Haligonians was estimated at 1,750, of which 1,227 lived in the 
Maynard-Creighton Street area of the North End. See Institute of Public Affairs, Dalhousie 
University, Condition of Negroes of Halifax City, 4-5. 
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delinquency, broken families and general demoralization.”21 Similarly, the 
Halifax branch of the Community Planning Association of Canada made the 
connection between overcrowding and crime, noting “almost without exception, 
juvenile delinquents come from sections where there is bad housing  . . . . 
When families have moved to better residential areas, with opportunity for 
play, nothing further has been heard about the children who were previously 
delinquents.”22
But many who lived in the area designated for clearance had their own ideas 
of what was in their best interest, and they opposed redevelopment. The Black 
residents of the Maynard and Creighton streets area found a spokesman in 
Reverend W.P. Oliver, the long-time minister of the Cornwallis Street Baptist 
Church that served the neighbourhood. A member of the Slum Clearance 
and Public Housing Committee, he was an important advocate for the Black 
community in Nova Scotia. In 1945 he founded the Nova Scotia Association for 
the Advancement of Colored People, an integrated group committed to, among 
other things, securing better housing for African Nova Scotians and promoting 
“better human relations based upon a mutual understanding among the various 
groups, with special emphasis on colored-white relations.”23 While insisting he 
was not against progress, Oliver had misgivings about the plan to clear the North 
End and encouraged people to do as he did and let the city know their position.
Identifying Haligonians as Black or White is difficult in the absence of 
census information. I have done so on the basis of their addresses and the 
substance of what they wrote. In a series of letters written as part of an organized 
campaign, Black residents pushed back against the proposed clearance of their 
neighbourhood. Despite their lower socio-economic status, a greater proportion 
of them owned their homes compared to their White counterparts. Ownership 
was “a form of insurance against involuntary removal” and the racism that 
made it difficult to find shelter in the city.”24 W.P. Oliver contended that 35 per 
cent of African Nova Scotians in the North End were homeowners, significantly 
more than the 23 per cent average for the census tract as a whole. Although he 
21 Meeting of the Slum Clearance and Public Housing Committee, 24 October 1951, pp. 19, 20, 25, 
and 11, Slum Clearance and Public Housing Committee Minutes, 102-67, file 1, HMA. 
22 Public Hearing re: Rezoning the area bounded by Charles, Gerrish Streets, rear of Gottingen 
and rear of Agricola Streets from C2 zone to C3 zone, 21 January 1954, p. 60, Slum Clearance 
and Public Housing Committee Minutes, 102-67, file 3, HMA.
23 Colin A. Thomson, Born with a Call: A Biography of Dr. William Pearly Oliver, C.M. (Dartmouth, 
NS: Black Cultural Centre for Nova Scotia, 1986), 80.
24 John I. McVittie, A Redevelopment Study of Halifax, Nova Scotia, 1957: Supplementary Volume 
(Halifax: Institute of Public Affairs, Dalhousie University, 1957), 17.
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did not supply statistics, Gordon Stephenson observed that “for longstanding 
social reasons, the highest owner-occupancy rate is in that part [of Halifax] in 
which there is a high concentration of Negro families.”25
For Black Haligonians, the violence of slum clearance did not just lie in being 
made to move; it also stemmed from the forcible taking of their property and 
hence their security. As the language they used suggests, they recognized slum 
clearance as an aggressive attempt to reorganize property ownership in the city. 
Historians’ arguments about the relative weakness of the municipal state in 
Atlantic Canada aside, these African Nova Scotians had no doubt about its power.
“I am against the City taking over our homes. I have always tried to keep 
my home in the best shape I could. I am satisfied with it and so is my family,” 
Mrs. Carey of 177 Creighton Street wrote to the mayor and members of the 
Slum Clearance and Public Housing Committee in 1954. “Why should the City 
take it or buy it from us? My parents lived in this part of the city and we were 
brought up here. We live in the best manner we can for our incomes. If you 
take this district where will we go?” In registering his opposition, Henry Kane 
underscored his military service. “Now after many years of sweat, tears and 
broken hearts, I have been able to purchase my home, in which I now live and I 
do not wish anyone to come along and destroy it,” he wrote. “I certainly do not 
wished to be chased out of this section or have my property taken away and my 
family scattered.” And the Browns let the city know that as “property owners” 
they opposed “being pushed out.”26
Louise James echoed the sentiments of her neighbours and gave explicit 
voice to the fears many African Nova Scotians had about redevelopment: “I 
have not the money to live in a more expensive house and even if the City gave 
me good money for my home where could I go?”27 Low-cost public housing was 
25 Public Hearing Re: Rezoning the Area Bounded by Charles, Gerrish Streets, Rear of Gottingen 
and Rear of Agricola Streets from C2 Zone to C3 Zone, 21 January 1954, p. 58, Slum Clearance 
and Public Housing Committee Minutes, 102-67, file 3, HMA; Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 
Ninth Census of Canada, 1951 – Population and Housing Characteristics by Census Tracts: 
Halifax, Bulletin CT-1 28-1-1953 (Ottawa: Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 1953), 6. The figures for 
owner-occupancy and tenancy were calculated for census tract 5; see Gordon Stephenson, A 
Redevelopment Study of Halifax, Nova Scotia, 1957 (Halifax: Corporation of the City of Halifax, 
1957), 46. 
26 Mrs. [illegible] Carey, 177 Creighton Street, to Mayor Donahoe, Members of Council, Members 
of the Town Planning Board, 17 March 1954; Henry Kane to Mayor Donahoe, Members of 
Council, Members of the Town Planning Board, 17 March 1954; and Elmer Brown and Mrs. John 
Brown to Mayor Donahoe, Members of Council, Members of the Town Planning Board, 17 
March 1954, all in Slum Clearance and Public Housing Committee Minutes, 102-67, file 3, HMA.
27 Mrs. Louise James, 221 Creighton Street, to Mayor Donahoe, Members of Council, Members of 
the Town Planning Board, 17 March 1954, in Slum Clearance and Public Housing Committee 
Minutes, 102-67, file 3, HMA.
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the obvious answer, but many Black Haligonians did not consider it a viable 
option; despite assurances, many believed that they would not be welcome 
in such facilities.28 Finding private accommodation was also difficult. As the 
Jewish Labour Committee discovered during its investigations in Halifax in 
the early 1960s, African Nova Scotians faced serious discrimination in securing 
housing and employment.29
If owning a house was a source of security, W.P. Oliver also considered it 
proof of an individual’s moral worth. “I am opposed to taking people out of 
their own homes and compelling them to live in apartments,” he told his 
colleagues on the Slum Clearance and Public Housing Committee. “Men and 
women who have had the spirit of citizenship and spunk to save and build a 
home should be allowed to live as first class citizens.” In his view, to force people 
to give up their homes was to erode their status as citizens. At the very least, it 
was discriminatory. He wondered if the city was holding Black homeowners to 
higher building standards, or, short of that, whether Black homeowners were 
being made to pay for the fact that White landlords had turned the area into a 
slum by not keeping up the properties they rented out in the neighbourhood.30
Many of the White residents in the North End were also opposed to slum 
clearance. While their arguments echoed some of the same sentiments about 
security and citizenship, they also emphasized what in their view was the anti-
democratic nature of redevelopment. “Would those in authority be glad to give 
up their homes and go in apartments with dozens of other families and pay rent 
to someone else instead of ownership and privacy?” asked “Disgusted” in a letter 
to the Mail-Star. “We are going to suffer because of what some others think is 
a good idea,” Creighton Street grocer Harold Hoare observed. “These homes 
might not provide much toward another home [i.e., in terms of the compensation 
owners received] but at least they are a place to live. Under this scheme where is 
the security for these people? Where is the justice?” According to C.H. Griffith 
of 17 Bauer Street, “A small group in authority has decided to confiscate an area 
of the city, force the people out and demolish their homes, regardless of their 
28 On behalf of the Nova Scotia Association for the Advancement of Colored People, W.P. Oliver 
called upon “the authorities who control public housing show some inclination to accept 
Coloured tenants.” See Public Hearing Re: Rezoning the Area Bounded by Charles, Gerrish 
Streets, Rear of Gottingen and Rear of Agricola Streets from C2 Zone to C3 Zone, 21 January 
1954, pp. 58-59, Slum Clearance and Public Housing Committee Minutes, 102-67, file 3, HMA.
29 Walker, “Black Confrontation in Sixties Halifax,” 178.
30 Public Hearing Re: Rezoning the Area Bounded by Charles, Gerrish Streets, Rear of Gottingen 
and Rear of Agricola Streets from C2 Zone to C3 Zone, 21 January 1954, pp. 64, 58, Slum 
Clearance and Public Housing Committee Minutes, 102-67, file 3, HMA. 
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unanimous disapproval. Is that democracy?” In his view, “Every man has an 
inalienable right to protect his home, and defend it against all enemies.”31
Given this opposition, and despite more than a decade of discussion after 
issuing its Master Plan, the city chose not to proceed with slum clearance. 
Instead, it would undertake a redevelopment study. On the basis of advice from 
the federal minister of Public Works, the mayor and council hired University 
of Toronto-based architect and planner Gordon Stephenson for the job in July 
1956. Like many of the planners hired in Canada in the postwar period, he 
was British.32 Before coming to Canada, he studied with noted Swiss-French 
architect Le Corbusier, and, in the United States, at the Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology. He worked first in Britain on postwar reconstruction and then 
in Australia, eventually returning there permanently in 1960.33
Although the Slum Clearance and Public Housing Committee had done a 
preliminary survey in 1955 of a 56-block area in the North End adjacent to the 
Citadel, in the ensuing debate about clearing the Maynard and Creighton streets 
area the city’s critics and even the pro-development Mail-Star encouraged it to 
“get all the facts first” before proceeding.34 Doing so became financially palatable 
because of changes to the National Housing Act, which allowed municipalities 
to share the costs of formulating a redevelopment plan with Ottawa. Other 
amendments in 1956 further incentivized slum clearance through a cost-sharing 
program that helped cities to acquire and clear properties in such residential 
areas, and allowed them to put that land to its “highest and best use” rather than 
requiring it to be redeveloped for low-cost rental housing.35
Certainly these financial incentives played a role in Gordon Stephenson’s 
hiring. As one former city alderman told planning scholar Jill Grant, at the 
time “at least 75 per cent of the Council were not pro-planning” as they saw it 
as interfering with free enterprise. Yet in the end they were convinced to hire 
31 DISGUSTED (Letter to the Editor), “He Opposes Redevelopment,” Halifax Mail-Star, 24 January 
1956; “Resident owners reported opposing redevelopment,” Mail-Star 31 December 1955; C.H. 
Griffith (Letter to the Editor), “Government in Democracy,” Mail-Star, 15 February 1956; C.H. Griffith 
(Letter to the Editor), “An appeal to Ottawa?” Mail-Star, 14 February 1956. All these are in City of 
Halifax fonds, Halifax City Manager’s Office subject files, Slum Clearance, 102-4A-57. file 2, HMA.
32 The preference for hiring British planners is something noted in James T. Lemon, Liberal 
Dreams and Nature’s Limits: Great Cities in North America since 1600 (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1996), 267 and Stephen V. Ward, “British and American Influences on Canadian 
Urban Planning, 1910-1975,” British Journal of Canadian Studies 13, no. 1 (1998): 125-39.
33 Jenny Gregory and David L.A. Gordon, “Introduction: Gordon Stephenson, Planner and Civic 
Designer,” Town Planning Review 83, no. 3 (2012): 269-78.
34 “Get all the facts first,” Mail-Star, 9 January 1956, City Manager’s Office subject files, Slum 
Clearance, 102-4A-57. file 2, HMA. 
35 Stephenson, Redevelopment Study of Halifax, vii.
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a planner, in no small part because access to federal monies for redevelopment 
required cities to create comprehensive plans and because “other cities had 
them [planners] and this was supposed to be the thing to do.”36
The alderman’s comment speaks to the general enchantment with planning 
expertise in the postwar period. In North America the 20 to 25 years after the 
Second World War have been dubbed planning’s “Golden Age,” a period when 
such expertise “was perhaps most unchallenged.”37 North American cities 
contracted with planners and established their own planning departments, 
deploying them against urban decline. As Wendell E. Pritchett argues, planners 
were instrumental in developing that discourse of degeneration – one that 
positioned their profession as possessed of the expertise to address and ultimately 
reverse it.38
Cities had grown organically over centuries and as a result, it was not 
uncommon for people to live, work, play, and pray in the same neighbourhood. 
While Jane Jacobs would come to see this variety of uses as the lifeblood of 
cities, beginning in the mid-19th century in Europe, and especially after 1945 
in North America, urban experts considered such jumbled use inefficient and 
unhealthy; indeed, the encroachment of commercial and industrial enterprises 
on formerly residential districts could only result in “blight” and, ultimately, 
the development of slums: these were areas “with run-down buildings, dirty 
streets, and a high crime rate . . . almost exclusively occupied by poor people.”39
Never precisely defined in the urban context, “blight” connoted disease; 
indeed, that was its original meaning. Members of the Chicago school of sociology 
were the first to apply the term in a city setting in their examinations of poverty 
in the 1920s and 1930s. In doing so, they naturalized urban decline and justified 
intervention by experts. In their view, cities were organisms with metabolisms and 
ecologies. Just as the expertise of the plant pathologist was required to diagnose 
and treat crops afflicted by blight, so too was scientific intervention by planners 
necessary to address urban decline and prevent its spread. Comprehensive 
planning – seeing the city as a whole – would ensure rational and profitable 
36 Jill Grant, The Drama of Democracy: Contention and Dispute in Community Planning (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1994), 60.
37 Helen Meller, Towns, Plans, and Society in Modern Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997), 67; Stephen Bocking, “Constructing Urban Expertise: Professional and Political 
Authority in Toronto, 1940-1970,” Journal of Urban History 33, no. 1 (November 2006): 52.
38 Wendell E. Pritchett, “The ‘Public Menace’ of Blight: Urban Renewal and the Private Uses of 
Eminent Domain,” Yale Law and Policy Review 21, no. 1 (Winter 2003): 13-17.
39 Pritchett, “‘Public Menace’ of Blight,” 16.
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urban growth.40 In setting out a blueprint for a modern, healthy, and efficient city, 
“master plans” like the one produced for Halifax called for the separation and 
regulation of land use through zoning and for the “renewal” of blighted areas and 
slums through the acquisition and clearance of their properties.
Released in June 1957, Gordon Stephenson’s redevelopment study of Halifax 
was in many ways a classic statement of the ideals of postwar planning. It called 
for municipal authorities to revise the city’s zoning, to apply its bylaw relating 
to minimum standards for housing (and indeed to make those standards more 
stringent), and to strengthen building and health inspection. Since any modern 
city had to accommodate cars, it discussed parking and road works, including 
highways, to improve the flow of traffic.
Most importantly for my purpose, Stephenson also outlined seven 
redevelopment schemes and underscored the need to provide housing for 
those displaced. Like the Master Plan of 1945 and the 10 Year Development Plan, 
he focussed primarily on the area north and east of the Citadel – that is, on 
the North End and the area around City Hall and the City Market. And like 
these two previous plans he treated Africville’s redevelopment as a foregone 
conclusion, something that was both necessary and long overdue:
There are only two things to be said. The families will have to be 
rehoused in the near future. The land which they now occupy will be 
required for the further development of the City. A solution which 
is satisfactory, socially as well as economically, will be difficult to 
achieve. Africville stands as an indictment of society and not of 
its inhabitants. They are old Canadians who have never had the 
opportunities enjoyed by their more fortunate fellows.41
Moving them out, in other words, was an act of justice for a maligned minority, 
something beyond discussion. He did not, however, prioritize the area’s 
redevelopment or even include it in his study area.
Stephenson insisted he had not produced a detailed, costed plan but a set of 
ideas that could be adopted as part of a comprehensive proposal to be carried 
out over 20 years.42 City Council, however, was not so patient. By the time Halifax 
officials approached the first residents of Africville about leaving in 1964, they were 
40 Pritchett, “‘Public Menace’ of Blight,” 16.
41 Stephenson, Redevelopment Study of Halifax, 27-8.
42 Stephenson, Redevelopment Study of Halifax, viii, 56.
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well practiced in acquiring properties and demolishing them with the “federal 
bulldozer” – that is, with funds provided through the federal government under 
the National Housing Act.43 Consistent with Stephenson’s recommendations, they 
had initiated five redevelopment projects with provincial and federal support (Table 
1 and Figure 2). Together, these promised to uproot literally thousands of people.
Table 1 – Clearance Projects in Halifax Undertaken Under the  
Auspices of the National Housing Act, 1957-196244
Area Year Initiated Acres Population Families
Jacob Street 1957, 1959, 1961 17.3 1,843 309
Maitland Street 1958 1.4 139 31
Spring Garden South 1960 4.6 384 83
Downtown Waterfront 1960 9.7 44 10
Uniacke Square 1962 72.0 4,090 980
Note: The Jacob Street Redevelopment Area was later named the Central Redevelopment Area. 
Figures for the Uniacke Square redevelopment project are initial ones; the plan was not carried 
out in its entirety. Nevertheless, its implementation resulted in the displacement of approximately 
2,000 people.45
43 The phrase comes from Martin Anderson’s critique of the federally funded urban renewal 
program in the United States, The Federal Bulldozer: A Critical Analysis of Urban Renewal, 1949-
1962 (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1964).
44 Cities receiving federal funding for redevelopment under the National Housing Act (NHA) 
were required to rehouse families displaced by the redevelopment projects it funded. They 
were not responsible for roomers or boarders. The Jacob Street Redevelopment Project was 
initiated in 1957 and the area undergoing redevelopment was enlarged in 1959 and again 
in 1961 to accommodate what would become the Cogswell Interchange. It was essentially 
“Scheme 9” in Stephenson’s report. See Redevelopment, Halifax, NS, 14 November 1957, 
Redevelopment Committee Minutes, 102-42A, pp. 5-6, HMA; Supplementary Resolution to 
Original Submission dated 14 November 1957 for Redevelopment of the Cogswell-Jacob Street 
Area,” in Redevelopment Committee Minutes, 3 April 1959, p. 1, Appendix X, 102-42A HMA; 
and City of Halifax, Central Redevelopment Area (Cogswell-Jacob Street Area), Amendment to 
Original Submission of 14 November 1957, in Redevelopment Committee Minutes, 1 March 1961, 
pp. 2-3, 102-42A, HMA. The Maitland Street redevelopment area was designated as parking for 
the Gottingen Shopping Centre – “Scheme 8” of Stephenson’s report. See Memorandum from 
G.F. West, Commissioner of Works and Buildings to His Worship Mayor Vaughan, Chairman, 
and Members of the Housing Committee, 5 September 1958, re: Gottingen Street Shopping 
Centre and Parking – Block 17 Submission, p. 2, Redevelopment Committee Minutes, 102-42A, 
HMA. An earlier document gives slightly different figures: figures from Resolution, 18 March 
1958, Redevelopment Committee Submissions and Staff Reports, 102-42B, file B10, HMA, 
are 115 people and 25 families. The Spring Garden Road South redevelopment was based on 
“Scheme 12” of the Stephenson report. See Resolution, Spring Garden South Redevelopment, 
in Redevelopment Committee Minutes, 11 March 1960, pp. 1, 5, 102-42A, HMA. The Downtown 
Waterfront redevelopment area was based on “Scheme 11” of Stephenson’s report. See 
Redevelopment Committee Minutes, 31 March 1960, pp. 6-8, 102-42A, HMA. The Uniacke 
Square redevelopment area was based on “Scheme 6” of Stephenson’s report. See City of 
Halifax, Uniacke Square Redevelopment Project Report, 19 April 1962 (version 1), pp. 7, 13, 
Redevelopment Committee, Reports, etc., 102-42D, file 1, HMA. 
45 Rutland, Displacing Blackness, 143-5 Rutland also notes that there were subsequent phases of 
redevelopment around Uniacke Square in the late 1960s, which displaced a further 3,000 people.
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Figure 2 – Clearance projects funded through the National Housing Act before the city acted 
on Africville in 1964.
Source: Map by Eric Leinberger.
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As “the worst part of the central area” of Halifax, the blocks around City 
Hall, the City Market, and Jacob Street were the first priority for redevelopment 
(Figure 3). With a few exceptions, Gordon Stephenson, like J. Philip Dumaresq 
before him, considered them “generally in deplorable condition,” a slum: “Here 
are some of the worst tenements, and dirty cinder sidewalks merge with patches 
of cleared land littered with rubbish. It is suggested that the clearance of this 
area should have high priority.” Like many planners, Stephenson believed the 
physical state of the neighbourhood was indicative of its moral state. The maps 
in his Redevelopment Study suggested that crime and juvenile delinquency 
characterized the area, and that it was home to a large number of poor and 
unhealthy people. As part of his research, he mapped the location of “hard 
core” relief cases, children testing positive for tuberculosis, incidents under the 
criminal code, fire risk, and “serious deficiencies in sanitary equipment.”46 To 
borrow Sean Purdy’s phrase from his work on slum clearance in Toronto’s Regent 
Park, Jacob Street was one of Halifax’s “pariah spaces” – made so in no small part 
by the work of planners like Stephenson and those who came before him.47
Figure 3 – Planner Gordon Stephenson considered the Jacob Street neighbourhood one of 
the worst areas in Halifax and advised the city to target it first. This is Jacob Street, looking 
north, between Starr Street and Poplar Grove, 1961.
Source: City of Halifax Works Department, photograph 102-39-1-716.5, Halifax Municipal Archives 
(HMA).
46 Stephenson, Redevelopment Study of Halifax, 25-6, 37, 35, 41, 45, 49. 
47 Sean Purdy, “Constructing Pariah Spaces in the Americas: Newspaper Representations of 
Slums, Ghettos and Favelas in the 1960s,” 219-28, in New World Coming: The Sixties and the 
Shaping of Global Consciousness, ed. Karen Dubinsky, Catherine Krull, Susan Lord, Sean Mills, 
and Scott Rutherford (Toronto: Between the Lines Press, 2009).
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Consistent with the thinking on urban reform, Stephenson believed 
overcrowding was ultimately to blame for these conditions. Indeed, the blocks 
around Jacob Street were some of the worst in his study area – and the city 
generally – where as many as two-thirds to three-quarters of the dwellings 
were overcrowded.48 The solution was to knock them down and get people into 
better housing, though not necessarily in the same area.
There were 185 properties in this redevelopment area.49 Most of the 
residential ones were occupied by their owners, many of whom had tenants. 
Indeed, Halifax was a city of renters rather than owners, with 53 per cent of 
dwellings occupied by tenants in 1951. But in the census tract in which the Jacob 
Street Redevelopment Area was located, 86 per cent of dwellings were occupied 
by tenants. That said, the area was not entirely residential: some buildings 
housed families and small businesses, and the neighbourhood also featured 
other businesses like the Sanitary Barbershop and Keller’s Second Hand. It was 
also home to some larger enterprises like Clayton’s Clothing and machinists 
W&A Moir as well as institutions like the Navy and the Salvation Army, whose 
hostel served 2,200 men every month.50
The cost of acquiring and clearing land in the redevelopment area was 
shared equally between the municipal and federal governments. While the city 
preferred to acquire land through negotiation, it did resort to expropriation 
when discussions with owners reached an impasse. In acquiring properties, 
city Compensation Officer C.D. Smith used a formula: initially, he offered 
owners assessed value plus 5 per cent.51 Many settled for that amount. His 
recommendations came before the Redevelopment Committee of City Council 
for discussion and approval. Occasionally property owners, especially the 
proprietors of small businesses or their legal representatives, appeared before 
the committee to plead their cases. Few opposed redevelopment; instead, 
48 Gordon Stephenson defined overcrowding as situations in which there were more people 
than rooms in a dwelling. Kitchens counted as rooms, but not bathrooms, hallways, attics, or 
unfinished cellars. See his Redevelopment Study of Halifax, 46. 
49 Minutes of a Meeting of the Halifax City Council, 15 September 1960, p. 1070, 102-1, HMA.
50 For statistics on tenant- and owner-occupied dwellings, see Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 
Ninth Census of Canada, 1951, p. 6; for businesses, see Might’s Halifax-Dartmouth Street 
Directory, 1955 (Halifax: Might Directories Atlantic Limited, 1955). On Moirs and the Salvation 
Army, see Minutes of a meeting of the Redevelopment Committee, 23 June 1959, p. 4, 
Redevelopment Committee Minutes, 102-42A, HMA.
51 Memorandum from L.M. Romkey, Acting City Manager, to the Mayor and Members of City 
Council, re: Property Acquisitions, Jacob Street Redevelopment Area, 5 April 1961, in Minutes 
of a Meeting of the Redevelopment Committee, 26 April 1961, Redevelopment Committee 
Minutes, 102-42A, HMA.
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what they took issue with was the compensation offered and the difficulties of 
finding alternative housing and re-establishing their businesses.52
Once owners sold, they had 30 days to vacate. In cases where the building 
was a tenement, the 30 days was meant to allow tenants enough time to find 
other accommodations. That was not always possible, which meant the city left 
the building standing and became a landlord, collecting rent until such time as 
it could facilitate moves for these tenants and demolish the property. Although 
tenants did not appear before the Redevelopment Committee to take issue with 
what was happening to them, they did make their feelings known other ways. 
A significant number refused to pay their new landlord rent even though that 
effectively disqualified them from being accepted into public housing.53 A few 
others simply refused to leave, forcing the city to call the police to evict them.54
Despite these small rebellions, the process of acquiring properties in the 
Jacob Street area moved quickly at first: the city secured nearly half them in 
the first year of the redevelopment program, 1958-1959.55 Getting the rest proved 
to be more difficult, requiring protracted negotiations and, in some cases, 
formal expropriation proceedings.56 By 1962, it had acquired all the land and 
issued a call for redevelopment proposals. After a false start, construction on 
Scotia Square finally began in the late 1960s and was followed by the Cogswell 
Interchange. In between, as Christopher Parsons notes, the neighbourhood 
looked remarkably like the bombed out British towns Gordon Stephenson had 
helped rebuild as a young planner.57
52 For examples, see Rutland, Displacing Blackness, 128-9.
53 On non-payment of rent and disqualification from public housing, see Minutes of a Meeting of 
the Redevelopment Committee, 20 February 1959, p. 2, Redevelopment Committee Minutes, 
102-42A, HMA; for a list of people behind in their rent to the city, see Memo: C.D. Smith, 
Compensation Officer, to Mayor J.E. Lloyd and Members of the Redevelopment Committee, 
21 February 1961, re: Rental Arrears – Jacob Street Redevelopment Area in Redevelopment 
Committee Submissions and Staff Reports, 102-42B, file B43, HMA.
54 See the case of Elmer Fleet discussed in Minutes of a Meeting of the Redevelopment 
Committee, 21 November 1961, pp. 8-9, Redevelopment Committee Minutes, 102-42A, HMA.
55 Minutes of a Meeting of the Redevelopment Committee, 24 March 1960, pp. 1-2, 
Redevelopment Committee Minutes, 102-42A, HMA.
56 The city had acquired 119 properties by April 1960; see Minutes of a Meeting of the 
Redevelopment Committee, 28 April 1960. By May 1961, 129 properties had been acquired; 
see Minutes of a meeting of the Redevelopment Committee, 10 May 1961. The decision to 
expropriate the remaining properties was taken in February 1961; see Minutes of a Meeting of 
the Redevelopment Committee, 1 February 1961. On the fact that the majority of properties 
were acquired by negotiation, see Minutes of a Meeting of the Redevelopment Committee, 26 
April 1961.
57 Christopher Parsons, “‘The Civic Bible for Future Development’: Power, Planning, and Expertise 
in Halifax, 1956-1962” (honours thesis in history, University of King’s College, 2009), 42. John 
Phyne notes the same kind of delay in St. John’s between clearing a redevelopment area and 
the actual redevelopment beginning; See his “On a Hillside North of the Harbour.”
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Almost from the start of redevelopment in the Jacob Street area, the city’s 
aldermen and its welfare department expressed concerns about those forced 
out by redevelopment. While the city was obliged to rehouse displaced families 
(but not individuals), its redevelopment program was also diminishing the 
accommodations available and driving up rents. This had secondary effects, 
making life harder for poor and working-class residents in a city that had a 
history of housing shortages.
In fact, the problem of high rents and housing insecurity was compounded 
by two initiatives the city undertook on its own and outside jointly funded 
redevelopment areas like Jacob Street. Both have largely escaped attention in 
discussions of urban renewal in Halifax. But as will become apparent, these 
municipal initiatives to address substandard housing and blight were at least 
as important as the federal bulldozer – the NHA – in reshaping the city. They 
speak to the power of the municipal state in unsettling the lives of some of its 
most vulnerable residents.
That is not to suggest that housing was always needlessly demolished: 
as the Committee on Works minutes reveal, many poor and working class 
Haligonians lived in abysmal conditions that threatened their health and safety. 
For example, in 1958 the city ordered a three-storey tenement near Cunard and 
Agricola Streets taken down because it was dilapidated: home to 44 people, its 
floors sagged and its walls bulged from structural weaknesses. “Mrs. Parsons, 
a tenant in the above building, said that her nine-year-old daughter was in 
the hospital for the third time this year and another daughter had a serious 
bronchial condition. She said her husband was a disabled war veteran and 
couldn’t afford to pay high rent.”58
The Hollis Street property owned by Lillian King was ordered demolished 
because “there was no hot water in the building, no bath, no vent in the toilet, 
evidence of rats and that the roof was leaking.” A tenant who had lived in 
King’s building for five years informed the Committee on Works that the 
house “was alive with rats; that in some places the floor would collapse under 
a person’s weight.”59
The basement floor of the house Albert J. Walker owned and rented out on 
Brunswick Street rested directly on dirt, and the rooms were not very high; less 
58 Committee on Works Minutes, 5 May 1958, p. 94, Committee on Works Minutes, 102-39A, HMA.
59 Committee on Works Minutes, 26 May 1958, p. 116, Committee on Works Minutes, 102-39A, 
HMA.
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than seven feet in the basement and only five feet, five inches in one of toilets. 
Nevertheless, he took the city to court in 1961 to challenge its teardown order.60
The municipal wrecking ball gained part of its momentum from Ordinance 
No. 50. Passed in 1956, this bylaw, which took effect 1 January 1958, set 
minimum standards for the occupancy of dwellings built before 1945.61 Halifax 
was one of the few cities in Canada to have a minimum standards ordinance, 
or so it claimed.62 It required property owners to maintain dwellings “in a state 
of good repair and structurally sound and fit for human habitation.” To that 
end, it set out requirements for space, ventilation, light, and sanitation, among 
other things.63
Building inspectors for the Works Department informed owners of the 
repairs necessary to bring their dwellings up to standard and set a deadline for 
them to do so, one that was backed by severe penalties. Not only were those who 
failed to comply subject to a fine of up to $100 or two months imprisonment, but 
“every day during which any such contravention or failure to comply continues 
shall be deemed a fresh offence.”64 In some cases, inspectors judged buildings to 
be beyond repair. Their recommendations for demolition were passed on to the 
Committee on Works, a body of the City Council, for a final decision.
Although Stephenson thought the standards set out in the ordinance 
were too low, he nevertheless pushed for their “forthright” and “vigorous” 
application.65 If the impressive number of inspections undertaken by the small 
staff at the Works Department is any indication, he got it.66 Inspections rose 
60 G.F. West, Commissioner of Works and Buildings, to T.C. Doyle, City Solicitor, re: Violation of 
Ordinance #50 – 385 Brunswick Street – Owner J. Albert Walker, 149 Herring Cove Road, 13 
February 1961, p. 1, Building Inspectors Correspondence, 102-39L, file 2, HMA. 
61 Ordinance No. 50 Respecting Minimum Standards for Housing Accommodation, 1956, 102-1D, 
HMA. It was revised in 1962 and made applicable to all buildings, not just those built before 
1945; see HMA 102-1D Ordinance No. 50-1962.
62 See Progress Report on Blight Removal and Public Housing, 5 December 1961, in Minutes of 
a Meeting of the Redevelopment Committee, 19 December 1961, Redevelopment Committee 
Minutes, 102-42A, HMA.
63 Stephenson, Redevelopment Study of Halifax, 62-3.
64 Office of the City Solicitor, City of Halifax, “Ordinance No. 50, 14 August 1956,” 102-1D, p. 7, HMA. 
Also cited in Stephenson, Redevelopment Report Study of Halifax, 63. 
65 Stephenson, Redevelopment Study of Halifax, 54, 58. 
66 The Building Inspection Division of the Works Department had a divisional engineer for 
buildings, an inspection supervisor, six permanent district inspectors, four temporary district 
inspectors, one district inspector responsible for electrical inspections, and two clerical staff. 
Of the permanent district inspectors, two were occupied full time with other tasks and not 
available for building inspection. See Memorandum from G.F. West, Commissioner of Works 
and Buildings to Chairman and Members of the Housing Policy Review Committee, 12 May 
1961, re: Interim Report – Implementation of Ordinance 50 – Minimum Standards – Sections 
744, 756 and 757 of the City Charter – Demolition of Dangerous and Dilapidated Buildings, p. 1, 
Building Inspectors Correspondence, 102-39L, file 1, HMA.
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steadily until 1963 (Table 2). Violations of Ordinance No. 50 came to the city’s 
attention in one of two ways: the first, which the Works Department deemed 
“voluntary,” included those violations that were uncovered as a result of a 
request from a property owner for an inspection or for a building permit to do 
minor repairs, something that necessitated an inspection. Violations also came 
to the attention of the Works Department in the course of building inspectors’ 
regular work (Figure 4), as part of the process of issuing tax certificates, from 
private individuals wishing to buy a property, from real estate agents wishing 
to buy or sell a property, or from tenants in substandard buildings. Because 
they did not arise from a request from the property owner, they were deemed 
to have been uncovered involuntarily.
Figure 4 – Building Inspector John MacDonald inspects 385 Gottingen Street, 1961.
Source: City of Halifax Works Department, photograph 102-39-1-912.8, HMA.
In addition to revealing the vigorous enforcement of Ordinance No. 50, the 
statistics in Table 2 also suggest that doing so had an additional and perhaps 
unanticipated effect: confronted with the prospect of undertaking expensive 
repairs, some owners chose to demolish their buildings. Regardless of whether 
owners did the necessary repairs or took down their offending dwellings, 
the city achieved its goal of improving conditions – but it was at the cost of 
diminishing the supply of housing.67 Between 1958 and 1965, 1,235 “dwelling 
units” were torn down.
67 Richard White makes the case that this sort of private redevelopment was more important 
in “renewing” Toronto that that undertaken by the state; see Richard White, “Urban Renewal 
Revisited: Toronto, 1950 to 1970,” Canadian Historical Review 97, no. 1 (Spring 2016): 1-33.
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Table 2 – Ordinance No. 50 and Building Demolition Statistics, 1958-196568
Year Ordinance No. 50 Violations Demolitions
 Dwelling Units Dwellings
 Uncovered as a Uncovered by Total City  City
 result of a Inspection Inspections Ordered Owner Ordered Owner
 request from the
 owner (“involuntary”)
 (“voluntary”)
1958 1,773 8,073 9,846 59 40 50 24
1959 1,470 9,169 10,639 30 56 14 50
1960 1,293 9,753 11,046 40 160 16 60
1961 1,770 9,656 11,426 120 217 49 102
1962 1,810 10,398 12,208 42 156 7 88
1963 1,665 12,429 14,094 14 86 16 77
1964 1,437 8,781 10,218 11 44 11 44
1965 113 479 592 10 19 3 10
Total 11,331 68,738 80,069 364 871 166 455
Source: The data in the table is from “City of Halifax – Works Department, Ordinance No. 50 
and Building Demolition Statistics,” 31 March 1965, in Halifax, Committee on Works records, 
Building inspectors’ correspondence and subject files, Ordinance 50 implementation [Dilapidated 
Buildings], 102-39L, file L1, HMA.
In addition to enforcing Ordinance No. 50, municipal authorities also 
deployed three sections of the city charter to rid Halifax of blight – namely, 
sections 754 (Dangerous Buildings), 756A (Buildings Destroyed or Partially 
Destroyed by Fire), and 757 (Dilapidated Buildings) – the latter of which was 
the most frequently used and the section under which most demolitions were 
carried out.69 Concerns about dilapidated buildings came to the attention of the 
Works Department the same way violations of Ordinance No. 50 did – that is, 
through voluntary and involuntary means.
68 The figures for 1965 are only for the period from the start of the year to March 31. A “dwelling 
unit” could vary in size; it is a place where a family, group of people, or a person could live. For 
instance, the city and CMHC reported that Mulgrave Park, a public housing project, had 348 
“dwelling units.” These were a mix of one-, two-, three-, and four-bedroom units. Given that, 
it is hard to tell from these figures just how many people were displaced; but one does get a 
sense of the loss of housing as a result of demolition. “Dwellings” simply refers to the number 
of residential buildings that were demolished, and those buildings could range from single-
family, detached houses to tenements housing scores of people.
69 Memorandum from G.F. West, Commissioner of Works and Buildings to Chairman and 
Members of the Housing Policy Review Committee, 12 May 1961, re: Interim Report – 
Implementation of Ordinance 50 – Minimum Standards – Sections 744, 756 and 757 of the 
City Charter – Demolition of Dangerous and Dilapidated Buildings, p. 3, Building Inspectors 
Correspondence, 102-39L, file 1, HMA.
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Figure 5 – This overview map shows the dwellings ordered demolished under the provisions 
of the city charter between 1958 and 1963. “Dwellings” were residences with single addresses; 
“Multiple addresses” were buildings that contained multiple residences but were not 
apartment buildings.
Source: Map by Eric Leinberger. The full map can be seen at https://drive.google.com/
open?id=1gdAy1GFB9G8t3LGR-kjc2wXGwqiYVl-2&usp=sharing.
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Figure 6 – The demolitions of dwellings under the city charter between 1958 and 1963 
were concentrated in the area north and east of the Citadel, the part of Halifax that had 
been targetted for redevelopment from 1945. As in Figure 5, “Dwellings” were residences 
with single addresses while “Multiple addresses” were buildings that contained multiple 
residences but were not apartment buildings.
Source: Map by Eric Leinberger. The full map can be seen at https://drive.google.com/
open?id=1gdAy1GFB9G8t3LGR-kjc2wXGwqiYVl-2&usp=sharing.
Figure 7 – There was a concentration of dwelling demolitions around the Maynard Street 
and Creighton Street area, where the majority of Halifax’s Black population lived, between 
1958 and 1963. As in Figure 5 and Figure 6, “Dwellings” were residences with single addresses; 
“Multiple addresses” were buildings that contained multiple residences but were not 
apartment buildings.
Source: Map by Eric Leinberger. The full map can be seen at https://drive.google.com/
open?id=1gdAy1GFB9G8t3LGR-kjc2wXGwqiYVl-2&usp=sharing.
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These sections of the charter empowered building inspectors to order 
dilapidated buildings removed by a specific date. In cases where owners did 
not comply, the Committee on Works held a public hearing. It heard from the 
owners and/or their representatives and considered a comprehensive report on 
the property in question produced by the Works Department in consultation 
with the city’s fire, health, electrical, and plumbing departments. In almost 
every case, the committee supported the recommendation of the Works 
Department and ordered demolition at the owner’s expense.
Unlike Ordinance No. 50, demolitions under the city charter were not 
limited to dwellings, but included all buildings. Table 3 and figures 5, 6, and 7 
have been compiled from summaries of demolitions for the years 1958-1963. The 
figures are incomplete (especially for 1962), but they are nevertheless revealing 
of the geography of demolition undertaken by the city largely outside federally 
funded redevelopment areas like Jacob Street. The city demolished dwellings in 
the older parts of the city, particularly north of the Jacob Street redevelopment 
area, in the North End, including Maynard Street and Creighton Street. 
Unsuccessful in their earlier efforts at slum clearance, municipal authorities 
chipped away at that area through their application of the city charter.
In addition to targetting substandard housing, the Works Department 
also had its building inspectors identify barns, garages, and sheds – non-
residential buildings – for demolition. Although these buildings were 
dispersed throughout the peninsula, like the residential dwellings targetted 
for demolition they too were concentrated in the North End. Ridding the area 
of such buildings was meant to reduce the costs of redevelopment. When the 
city began the process of acquiring properties in the North End as part of the 
Uniacke Square redevelopment project, it would not have to pay out quite as 
much if it had already made owners get rid of at least some of their dilapidated 
buildings. Given that the city and the federal government shared the costs of 
acquisition and clearing equally, municipal officials were likely interested in 
any economies they could achieve.
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Table 3: Demolitions, 1958-196370
Type of Structure Number Aggregate Totals
Apartment building 17
Dwellings 319+ Total 380+
Rooming houses 2  Dwellings
Stores + dwellings 42
Barns 12  Barns, Garages, and
Garages 183  Sheds 318+
Sheds 123+
Other 109  Other 109
Source: The data in this table was compiled from Committee on Works Minutes, 102-39A, HMA.
Although municipal officials were aware as early as April 1958 that Halifax’s 
most vulnerable residents were losing their housing to redevelopment, they 
were hard-pressed to know exactly how many. In part, this was because of the 
speed with which properties were acquired and demolished in the first year of 
the Jacob Street redevelopment: one alderman noted that 110 people had been 
put out in a single night when the city demolished 15 buildings.71
Gordon Stephenson estimated that implementing all his recommendations 
would result in the displacement of approximately 6,000 people, but that 
figure did not include those who lost their homes to the municipal demolition 
program. The city’s best guess was that 1,770 families would be rendered 
homeless from 1958 to 1960 thanks to the combined effects of its redevelopment 
program as well as the enforcement of Ordinance No. 50 and the provisions 
of the city charter. Daunting as that number was, it did not include those who 
were displaced by private development; the city’s director of welfare, H. Bond 
Jones, estimated this number to be 500.72
While rehousing families displaced by redevelopment was a condition 
of receiving federal funding, they numbered just 407.73 Public housing was 
70 These demolitions included the ones ordered by the city (either the building inspector 
directly or by the Committee on Works) under the city charter (most likely s. 757) and those 
undertaken by owners for new development (i.e., demolitions owners did on their own, in 
response to the opportunities offered by new development). The “+” are indicated because 
sometimes the entry noted that sheds or dwellings – plural – were demolished, but the exact 
number was not indicated.
71 Minutes of a meeting of the Housing Committee, 16 April 1958, p. 3, Redevelopment 
Committee Minutes, 102-42A, HMA.
72 Minutes of a meeting of the Redevelopment Committee, 15 April 1959, pp. 7, 3, Redevelopment 
Committee Minutes, 102-42A, HMA.
73 This is the total number of families displaced from the following redevelopment areas listed 
in the first table: Jacob Street, Maitland Street, Spring Garden Road, and the Downtown 
Waterfront.
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meant to take care of them, but construction on Mulgrave Park (348 units) was 
alarmingly slow and not all displaced families were deemed fit by the housing 
authority to be accommodated as they failed to meet its normative standards 
of respectability or its income thresholds.74 The first who did were not able to 
move in until just before Christmas in 1960, and the project was not completed 
until June 1961, more than three years after the Jacob Street redevelopment 
project had started. In any case, Bond Jones insisted the city needed at least 
ten times as many units, some 4,000, which “will be taken up as fast as the 
contractor can get them over.”75 The city, backed by the Central Mortgage and 
Housing Corporation (CMHC), took a very different view and insisted that it 
only needed to provide housing for one out of every four families displaced.76
Halifax had a “housing emergency” on its hands, one largely of its own 
making.77 Although Gordon Stephenson had insisted “it will not be possible 
to carry out the redevelopment schemes in the Study Area without first 
providing housing on three sites in the northern part of the city,” the city 
had completed just one by 1961, Mulgrave Park, and had just come to an 
agreement with the federal government about a second, to be called Westwood 
Park (209 units).78 While the loss of Halifax’s housing stock hit all poor and 
working class residents hard, Black Haligonians had a particularly difficult 
time finding alternative shelter. As W.P. Oliver told the Committee on Works 
in 1958, when it ordered the house at 175 Creighton Street demolished under 
s. 757, racism prevented its tenants – members of his congregation – from 
being rehoused. When they “attempted to obtain other quarters they were 
quite successful on the telephone but when they went to the property, they 
were told it was occupied.” In his view, “unless some solution was found, his
74 Rutland, Displacing Blackness, 130-2. Christine Knott and John Phyne discuss the housing 
eligibility criteria that the St. John’s Housing Authority used in the same period; see their 
“Rehousing Good Citizens: Gender, Class, and Family Ideals in the St. John’s Housing Authority 
Survey of Inner City St. John’s, 1951 and 1952,” Acadiensis 47, no. 1 (Winter/Spring 2018): 178-207.
75 Minutes of a Meeting of the Housing Policy Review Committee, 11 July 1961, p. 14, Housing 
Policy Review Committee Records, 102-68, file 2, HMA.
76 Memorandum from K.M. Munnich, Director of Planning, to Chairman and Members of the 
Housing Policy Review Committee, 26 May 1961, re: Housing Policy, p. 3, Housing Policy Review 
Committee Records, 102-68, file 1, HMA. I could find no rationale for this policy.
77 Report of the Housing Policy Review Committee, 8 August 1961, p. 4, Housing Policy Review 
Committee Records, 102-68, file 3, HMA.
78 Stephenson, Redevelopment Study of Halifax, 57; Minutes of a Meeting of the Redevelopment 
Committee, 24 March 1960, p. 4, Redevelopment Committee Minutes, 102-42A, HMA; 
Report of the Housing Policy Review Committee, 8 August 1961, p. 3, Housing Policy Review 
Committee Records, 102-68, file 3, HMA.
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Figure 8 – Empty lot at 175 Creighton Street, with 177-183 Creighton Street behind. ca. 1960.
Source: City of Halifax Works Department, photograph 102-39-1-1401.12, HMA.
parishioners would wind up on the street.”79 Municipal authorities agreed, 
acknowledging the problem “was particularly acute with coloured families, to 
whom alternative housing is extremely limited.”80 The building came down 
nevertheless (Figure 8).
Incidents like these led H.B. Jones to report the following:
At the present time, people have fear and landlords are fearful, of 
what is going to happen. . . . You drive along the road, you see a house 
coming down, you say “Isn’t that nice the slum is being demolished,” 
and we know the buildings of low standards should be demolished. 
But how many times have you heard someone say “What happened 
to the people?”81
79 Committee on Works Minutes, 5 May 1958, p. 95, Committee on Works Minutes, 102-39A, HMA.
80 Report of the Housing Policy Review Committee, 8 August 1961, p. 4, Housing Policy Review 
Committee Records, 102-68, file 3, HMA.
81 Minutes of a Meeting of the Housing Policy Review Committee, 11 July 1961, p. 1, Housing Policy 
Review Committee Records, 102-68, file 2, HMA.
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Some families ended up sleeping in their cars or “putting up little shacks, or 
they are moving into somebody’s two-car or one car-garage” in the city and, 
increasingly, outside it.82 The welfare officer estimated that 200 families were 
leaving Halifax every month. “We have pushed hundreds of families all over 
Halifax County. We have them living in Digby, many in Cape Breton; we have 
them as far as Windsor and beyond. We are driving these people out.”83
In addition to homelessness, eliminating substandard housing had the effect 
of creating overcrowded conditions in the remaining housing stock. Estimates 
were that at least 1,000 Halifax families were living in one room in 1959.84 The 
irony of urban redevelopment creating new slums was not lost on some in 
municipal government, including Mayor Charles Vaughan: “The houses being 
torn down were certainly not fit accommodation but at least they were shelters 
for some people.”85
The solution, articulated by more than one alderman, was to slow down 
the demolitions and to coordinate them with the availability of new housing.86 
That did not happen. Indeed, the local press thought things were going too 
slowly. By failing to hire more staff to speed the inspection process, the city was 
letting landlords “escape penalties and avoid being compelled to make their 
properties fit for human habitation.”87
Despite the fact the city knew it was creating a housing emergency and its 
Works Department was stretched thin doing inspections, it seemed impossible 
to stop the municipal wrecking ball once it was in motion and the vista it had 
partially revealed – of a modern, prosperous city – was visible.
Looking north from Jacob Street, you get a different perspective on 
Africville. Slum clearance there unfolded in a strikingly different way than it 
did elsewhere in the city. Municipal officials were explicit in their intention to 
“deviate from the strict letter of the law” in acquiring properties and relocating 
82 Housing Policy Review Committee Minutes, 23 May 1961, p. 29, Housing Policy Review 
Committee Records, 102-68, file 1, HMA.
83 Minutes of a Meeting of the Housing Policy Review Committee, 11 July 1961, p. 2, Housing Policy 
Review Committee Records, 102-68, file 2, HMA.
84 Minutes of a Meeting of the Redevelopment Committee, 15 April 1959, p. 4, Redevelopment 
Committee Minutes, 102-42A, HMA.
85 Minutes of a Meeting of the Housing Committee, 16 April 1958, p. 1, Redevelopment 
Committee Minutes, 102-42A, HMA.
86 See the comments of Aldermen Trainor and O’Brien in Minutes of a Meeting of the Housing 
Committee, 16 April 1958, pp. 9, 11, in Redevelopment Committee Minutes, 102-42A, HMA, 
and H. Bond Jones’s comments in the Minutes of a Meeting of the Housing Policy Review 
Committee, 11 July 1961, Housing Policy Review Committee Records, 102-68, file 2, HMA.
87 “Better Able to Plunder,” Mail-Star, 5 December 1961, in Building Inspectors Correspondence, 
102-39L, file 1, HMA.
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residents. They chose not to pursue an agreement with the other levels of 
government under the NHA to clear the area, nor did they apply Ordinance 
No. 50 or the provisions of the city charter to rid it of substandard buildings 
before entering into negotiations with residents.88 Instead, they came up with 
new and different procedures to acquire land and property in Africville, ones 
that were more liberal than those used in the rest of the city.
Rather than restrict compensation to those who could prove legal 
ownership, municipal authorities decided to compensate all residents who 
claimed it: it negotiated with those who had deeds to the properties they 
occupied and those who did not – who in fact made up the majority. It also paid 
any municipal taxes residents owed and cleared their accounts at the Victoria 
General Hospital.89 The decision to take a broad approach to compensation 
meant the city could not enter into a redevelopment agreement with the 
other two levels of government: the National Housing Act only allowed for 
the compensation of people who had formal, legal ownership of the properties 
slated for acquisition and clearance.90
Having decided to dispense with the usual requirement for proof of 
ownership, the city also dispensed with the usual personnel and the formula 
it had used in coming to settlements in its other redevelopment areas. It 
hired a social worker to deal with Africville residents, acknowledging that 
different sensitivities and skills were required to acquire their properties and 
relocate them. Peter MacDonald’s job was taxing, but his caseload of some 80 
families living on 13 acres was less than that of C.D. Smith who, as Halifax’s 
sole compensation officer, was charged with buying properties in the rest of 
the city’s redevelopment areas. Unlike Smith, MacDonald was empowered to 
compensate those without property as well as those who were tenants, boarded, 
or lived with relatives – something that again spoke to the different approach 
the city took.
In addition, MacDonald’s recommendations for compensation were sent to a 
special Africville Subcommittee of City Council for review and approval rather 
than to the Redevelopment Committee. Its membership included two African 
Nova Scotian members of the Halifax Human Rights Advisory Committee, the 
advocates for the community, as well as the usual representation of aldermen.
88 “Africville,” City of Halifax Development Department Report, 23 July 1962, in Clairmont and 
Magill, Africville Relocation Report, Appendix A, p. A7. 
89 Unless otherwise noted, the description of the process of acquiring properties in Africville is 
taken from Loo, “Africville and the Dynamics of State Power,” 34-43.
90 “Africville,” City of Halifax Development Department Report, 23 July 1962, Appendix A, p. A9.
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Finally, municipal authorities agreed to help relocated residents find jobs, 
get the kind of education that would qualify them for better ones, and gain 
access to capital. They hired a job placement officer dedicated to the task, and 
organized night school classes aimed at getting Africville men to the level they 
needed to qualify for trades training.91 In addition, the city’s Social Planning 
Department helped establish the Seaview Credit Union, with a board of 
directors that included 11 former Africville residents. Designed to make loans 
available to former residents, it was for a time a positive force in stabilizing the 
financial circumstances of some families and in “providing a valuable social 
development experience, through participation in the decision making of the 
Credit Union operation.”92
As was the case with others who were displaced by redevelopment 
and demolition, the city also helped Africville’s residents find alternative 
accommodation. But the lengths it sometimes went to were extraordinary. For 
instance, it purchased a house on Gottingen Street for one couple, allowing 
them to rent it a rate they could afford, and it paid some unexpected repair bills 
on a house purchased by another former Africville family.93
All this raises the question of why the city of Halifax treated Africville 
differently. Perhaps it was simply being consistent: Halifax officials had always 
treated Africville differently, whether it was by failing to provide it with piped 
water, connect it to the sewer system, or sort out property ownership for the 
purposes of taxation. But those differences stemmed from inaction, from more 
than a century of neglect borne of racism. The divergent practices it followed 
in acquiring property and land in Africville required the city to expend more 
money and effort in compensation than it otherwise would have had it stuck 
to “the strict letter of the law.” Since only a handful of residents had deeds to 
91 Memorandum from P.F.C. Byars, City Manager, to Members of the Africville Subcommittee and 
Representatives of the Human Rights Advisory Committee, 23 September 1965, re: Staff Report 
– Progress Report – Africville, p. 1, Africville Subcommittee Minutes, 102-42C, HMA.
92 Memorandum re: Loan Fund for Former Africville Residents, 27 March 1969, p. 1, and 
Memorandum from McC. Henderson, City Manager, to Mayor Allan O’Brien and Members 
of Council, re: Africville Follow-Up Program 2 December 1970, p. 2, both in City Manager’s 
Correspondence, 102-4A-129, HMA.
93 See Memorandum from P.F.C. Byars, City Manager, to the Mayor and Members of the Africville 
Subcommittee, 31 May 1965, re: staff report – Africville – purchase of property 104 and 
memorandum from P.F.C. Byars, City Manager, to Members of the Subcommitee on Africville 
and Representatives of the Human Rights Advisory Committee, 4 March 1966, Staff Report 
– Mr. and Mrs. Stanley Dixon – 3188 Albert Street, Africville Subcommittee Minutes, 102-42C, 
HMA.
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their properties, the compensation paid out would not have been very much; 
certainly it would have been less than the more than $600,000 it expended.94
Rather than neglect, the course of action the city pursued in Africville 
seems to have been prompted by a sense of embarrassment. Racism, classism, 
and its location at the far north end of Halifax combined to put Africville 
beyond the pale of the city’s concern for much of the 20th century. But as 
attitudes began to change in the postwar period, thanks in no small part to 
the civil rights movement in the United States, Africville became an a source 
of shame. National and international coverage shed unfavourable light on race 
relations in Nova Scotia, and it became harder to ignore the situation in the 
neighbourhood. Writing for the New York Times, Raymond Daniell noted 
“there are no ‘White Only’ signs in this seaport, the capital of Nova Scotia, nor 
do Negroes have to go to the back of the bus.” But the province nevertheless had 
a “racial problem.” In his view “a sort of self-imposed segregation exists among 
a docile colored population.” Maclean’s Magazine agreed, calling Africville “the 
Black ghetto that fears integration.” Mary Casey informed readers of the Globe 
and Mail about the racial segregation in Halifax, noting that Africville was 
“worse than any blighted area already demolished by the city.”95
To the shock of many Canadians, Nova Scotia seemed aff licted by the 
kind of racism they associated with the United States. One of them, Mrs. 
Fleur Campbell, was so enraged by what she read that she urged “an economic 
boycott of Nova Scotia until integration of Africville into the White city of 
Halifax is effected – with the help of the RCMP if necessary.” Campbell might 
have been thinking of Norman Rockwell’s then-recent painting of six-year-
old African American Ruby Bridges being escorted to her desegregated school 
in New Orleans by federal marshals. Haligonians Mildred Millar and Leah 
Epstein, members of the Inter-Racial Council, took issue with the parallels 
drawn between racism in their city and that in the United States.96 Both wrote 
to the Globe and Mail and the Toronto Star to assure readers that “while things 
94 Clairmont and Magill, Africville Relocation Report, 279-80.
95 Raymond Daniell, “Nova Scotia hides a racial problem,” New York Times, 14 June 1964; Susan 
Dexter, “The Black Ghetto that Fears Integration,” Maclean’s, 24 July 1965; Mary Casey, “Negro 
Question Needs Answers,” Globe and Mail 27 October 1962; “Blight of Africville,” Globe and Mail, 
30 November 1963.
96 The Inter-Racial Council was an offshoot of the Halifax branch of the Voice of Women (VOW), 
part of the Canadian anti-war movement. According to historian Frances Early, the Halifax 
members of VOW were committed to combatting racial discrimination and prejudice – so 
much so that they set up a separate group, the Inter-Racial Council, to pursue those goals. See 
Frances Early, “‘A Grandly Subversive Time’: The Halifax Branch of the Voice of Women in the 
1960s,” in Fingard and Guildford, Mothers of the Municipality, 268.
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are very far from perfect here . . . Halifax will not be another Selma,” referring 
to the violence that had been visited upon civil rights activists who tried to 
march from that Alabama city to the state capital of Montgomery in 1965 to 
demand the right to vote for African Americans.97 As Scott Rutherford argues 
in terms of anti-Indigenous racism in 1960s Kenora, Ontario, Canadians 
commonly associated racism with the United States. Doing so was an assertion 
of anti-Americanism and nationalism, and, among other things, served to 
perpetuate the idea that racism, when it occurred in Canada, was aberrant, 
localized, and not part of the country’s history.98
Regardless of whether Halifax was another Selma, Alderman Abbie Lane 
believed Africville had become “a blot” on the city’s reputation visible beyond 
its borders.99 The community was obvious in a way it had not been before. 
The continuing existence of what looked to outsiders like a racially segregated 
“ghetto” was evidence that Halifax was not a “modern metropolis.”100 Among 
other things, a modern city was an integrated city. Even Black community 
advocate Reverend W.P. Oliver supported the destruction of Africville 
and the relocation of its residents – this despite the fact he had opposed the 
redevelopment of the North End because it would create housing insecurity for 
the African Nova Scotians who lived there.101
In light of the embarrassing reports about Africville and the shifting 
attitudes about racism informing them, municipal authorities were moved to 
act. For the city’s Development Department, integrating Africville’s residents 
was a “social necessity.” In acknowledging but denying residents’ request 
that arrangements be made for them to continue to live together after the 
relocation, municipal authorities argued “the City is a comprehensive urban 
97 Letter to the Editor, Globe and Mail, 20 July 1964, 6; Letter to the Editor, “Negroes in Nova 
Scotia,” Globe and Mail, 1 April 1965; and Letter to the Editor, “Government and Voluntary 
Groups Fight Discrimination in Nova Scotia,” Toronto Star 14 April 1965. Rockwell’s painting of 
Ruby Bridges was circulated in magazines in early 1964, the same year Fleur Campbell wrote 
her letter to the editor.
98 Scott Rutherford, “‘We Have Bigotry All Right – but No Alabamas’: Racism and Aboriginal 
Protest in Canada during the 1960s,” American Indian Quarterly 41, no. 2 (Spring 2017): 158-79.
99 Handwritten transcript of a meeting of the Housing Policy Committee, 1 August 1961, p. 5, 
Housing Policy Review Committee Records, 102-68, file 3, HMA. 
100 “Report of a Visit to Halifax with Particular Respect to Africville, 24-26 November 1963,” Dr. 
Albert Rose, professor of social work, University of Toronto, in Clairmont and Magill, Africville 
Relocation Report, Appendix F, p. A62.
101 Oliver was a member of the Halifax Human Rights Advisory Committee, a group of largely 
middle class Black and White Haligonians who advocated for Africville’s residents and 
ultimately supported the community’s relocation; see Clairmont and Magill, Africville 
Relocation Report, Appendix E, p. A54 and Loo, “Africville and the Dynamics of State Power,” 
29-32.
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community and it is not right that any particular segment of the community 
should continue to exist in isolation.” As well, there were practical reasons 
for integrating Africvillers: the CMHC would not fund segregated housing, 
and even if it agreed to such a project authorities argued that it probably 
would not be economically feasible. Given the level of poverty among the 
neighbourhood’s residents, it was unlikely that a separate public housing 
facility would generate the kind of average monthly rent that was necessary for 
it to operate financially.102
In addition to shifting attitudes about segregation and the acceptability of 
overt racism, the differential treatment of Africville’s residents also arose from 
an acknowledgement of the city’s longstanding neglect and the community’s 
“historicity.”103 Authorities admitted that doing nothing “has been the basic 
approach for over 100 years”; a statement that was the closest they came to 
recognizing the city’s responsibility for creating conditions in Africville. As well, 
the city may have been swayed by the fact many of its families had lived in the 
area for generations; this was acknowledged by both housing expert Albert Rose, 
who advised the city on Africville, and Gordon Stephenson, who claimed a kind 
of indigeneity for residents when he argued they were “old Canadians.” Certainly, 
in justifying the course of action it took in acquiring land for redevelopment, the 
Development Department recognized residents had lived there for “generations” 
and argued its actions were in the interest of “history and fair treatment.”104
In short, the city’s differential treatment of Africville was borne of 
embarrassment about segregation and was a reaction to the racism that had 
created it. The course of action it pursued did not result in better outcomes 
for all residents, but it is nevertheless significant. How the city chose to treat 
Africville sheds light on the power of the shift in attitudes about one particular 
manifestation of racism that was emerging in the early 1960s – and the limits 
of the critique that came from that shift. Both the city and the community’s 
advocates were motivated to take the action they did in Africville because racial 
segregation had become increasingly unsupportable, an issue of civil rights.
More numerous than Africvillers, the Black residents of the North End who 
were displaced by renewal garnered no such consideration. Racial segregation 
may have been unacceptable, but anti-Black racism still was. Despite their 
102 “Africville,” City of Halifax Development Department Report, 23 July 1962, in Clairmont and 
Magill, Africville Relocation Report, Appendix A, p. A6.
103 Clairmont and Magill, Africville Relocation Report, 62.
104 “Africville,” City of Halifax Development Department Report, 23 July 23, 1962, in Clairmont and 
Magill, Africville Relocation Report, Appendix A, pp. A4, A5.
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greater numbers and their poverty, they were geographically integrated into 
the city. Although municipal authorities acknowledged the difficulties Black 
Haligonians experienced in securing alternative housing, they were not moved 
to act differently. Indeed, they refused to even slow down the demolitions or 
coordinate them with the availability of housing.
The concern with the spatial expression of racism – with segregation – was 
consequential. Not only did it result in the differential treatment of Africville’s 
residents, but it also obscured other manifestations of anti-Black racism and 
the diversity of experiences Black Haligonians had with urban redevelopment. 
Equally importantly, it rendered the classism that characterized urban renewal 
invisible to both municipal authorities at the time and scholars of Halifax 
since then. Like the other areas in the city slated for redevelopment, Jacob 
Street and the North End were class-based ghettoes (Figure 9). Their White 
residents may have fewer difficulties in securing alternative housing than their 
Black neighbours, but redevelopment still disrupted their lives fundamentally. 
Ultimately, urban renewal in Halifax amounted to shovelling out the poor, 
whose vulnerability to displacement then and now was configured by both 
class and race as well as the ongoing power of the Africville story.
Figure 9 – Like the other areas slated for development, Jacob Street and the North End were 
class-based ghettos where Black and White Haligonians could live in close proximity. In this 
unidentified photograph, possibly of Market Street in 1950s, note the Black woman in the 
doorway and the White girl in the third floor window.
Source: City of Halifax Works Department, photograph 102-39-397.2, HMA.
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